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Abstract
To reduce the competition from farmers who self-produce seed, an inbred line seed pro-
ducer can switch to nondurable hybrid seed. In a two-period model we investigate the impact
of crop durability on self-production, pricing and switching decisions, and we examine the
impact of license fees paid by self-producing farmers. First, in an inbred line seed monopoly
model, we ﬁnd that the monopolist may produce technologically dominated hybrid seed in
order to extract more surplus from farmers. Further, the introduction of license fees improves
eﬃciency. Second, we study how the monopolist’s behavior is aﬀected by the entry of a non-
durable hybrid seed producer. We show that the inbred line seed producer might beneﬁt
from competing with a technologically dominated hybrid seed producer, as this allows for
consumers’ discrimination.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In Europe and North-America property rights in the seed sector are based on the Plant Breeder’s
Rights (PBRs) that grant the plant breeder exclusive rights on a new variety of seed. However,
PBRs also allow farmers to use the harvest of one production cycle to self-produce seed for the
next production cycle. A farmer who buys seed with valuable genetic traits (e.g., productivity,
resistance to pests, ﬁtness to a speciﬁc climate) has the opportunity to produce crops with
the same traits during the next production cycle. Therefore, by self-producing their own seed,
farmers directly compete with seed dealers. In this sense, crop traits can be considered as
durable goods.
To avoid competition from farmers through seed self-production, seed dealers can reduce
the durability of crop traits. If the quality of the trait decreases dramatically from one genera-
tion to the next, self-production becomes economically uninteresting. This can be achieved by
developing hybrid seed (as opposed to inbred line seed).1 This strategy has been followed for
corn since the 1950’s, sunﬂowers during the 1970’s, and more recently for canola (with partial
success) and wheat (without success). Table 1 below shows that the proportion of self-produced
seed is important for several major crops (wheat, barley, and canola). With the recent develop-
ment of biotechnology, ﬁrms have tried to develop some genetic artifacts, such as the Genetic
Use Restriction Technology or “GURT” (Goeschl and Swanson, 2003), that make the harvested
seeds sterile.
Recently, regulations in Europe (and also in Australia and other countries) have reformed
intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the seed sector by allowing license fees on crop traits.
More precisely, E.U. directive 2100/94 (article 14) indicates that a farmer who self-produces
seed should pay a license fee to the innovator that created the seed. In France, the directive
has been applied for wheat since 2001, through a tax on the harvest (0.5 Euro per ton, i.e., 4-5
Euros per ha). This tax is reimbursed if the farmer buys the seed or if he cultivates small areas.
1In genetic terms, inbred line seeds are homozygous. The consequence is that if an inbred line is self-pollinated,
its oﬀspring is genetically homogeneous and identical to the parent inbred line. Hybrid seeds are heterozygous
and result (generally) from the cross of two diﬀerent inbred lines (Gallais, 1990). Hybrid seed performance is
greater than the performance of the two inbred parental lines. When a hybrid is self-pollinated, its oﬀspring is
heterogeneous, with an average performance closer to the performance of the inbred parental lines (i.e., less than
the original hybrid performance).
2Table 1: Seed market and seed type for the major crops in France (2005)
Crop Surface (Mha) % Purchased seed % Hybrid seed
Wheat 5.2 58% 2%
Corn 3.2 100% 100%
Barley 1.6 80% 0%
Canola 1.2 75% 31%
Sunﬂower 0.6 100% 100%
Source: Semences et Progrès (num 123, 124 and 125). These ﬁve
crops represent 90% of the cash crops surface in France.
In accordance with the European directive, a large portion of the collected taxes is assigned to
the innovator that created the seed varieties (European Union, 1994). More precisely, in 2003-
2004 this tax has generated an additional proﬁt of 4.5 million Euros for the wheat breeders, an
increase of 18% of their proﬁt from the sale of seeds (Semence et Progrès, 2005).
Therefore, although seed producers cannot legally prevent self-production, they can techno-
logically discourage it by selling nondurable seed. In this context, we investigate the impact of
crop durability and license fees on self-production, crop traits, pricing strategies, and decisions
to reduce crop durability by switching to hybrid seeds. We also examine how license fees on
crop traits improve eﬃciency.
In our setting, either one type of seed (inbred line seed) or two types of seed (inbred line
and hybrid seed) can be produced by seed dealers, whereas farmers can only self-produce inbred
line seed. We assume that seed producers are more eﬃcient in producing seed than farmers.
Self-production is thus sub-optimal, but it appears to compete with powerful (e.g., monopolistic)
seed dealers. We also assume that hybrid seeds are more costly to produce (by seed producers)
but that once planted, they are more productive (for farmers) than inbred line seed. Therefore,
we impose no ap r i o r itechnological domination of one type of seed over the other, as this will
become a main parameter of our analysis.
W eb e g i nw i t hab e n c h m a r kc a s ei nw h i c hw es t u d yat w o - p e r i o di n b r e dl i n em o n o p o l i s t i c
seed industry, whereby the monopolist can commit on future prices. To fully understand the
3pricing strategies, we ﬁrst consider that farmers have homogeneous self-production costs. The
monopolist can choose between a durable good strategy where she sells inbred line seed to be
used in both periods, or a nondurable good strategy where she sells seed during each period.
With low farmer self-production costs, she sells seed as a durable good, whereas at a high cost,
she sells it as a nondurable good. Due to trait durability, she cuts second-period prices in order
to reduce self-production from farmers. Consequently, she extracts strictly less than if the traits
were nondurable, i.e., the nondurable monopoly proﬁt.
If the monopolist cannot commit in the ﬁrst period to the second-period price, the non-
durable good strategy is not sustainable. Because farmers make self-production decisions before
observing second-period prices, crop trait durability creates a hold-up problem that entails eﬃ-
ciency loss as well as a reduction in the monopoly’s market power. The monopolist would like
to commit to reduce her price in the second period in order to reduce self-production. How-
ever, once farmers have decided not to save part of their harvest to self-produce, they represent
a captive demand. Therefore, the monopolist raises her price up to the one-period monopoly
price. Expecting this behavior, all farmers self-produce seed, which is ineﬃcient.
However, farmers have heterogeneous self-production costs, and therefore, the nondurable
good strategy is always dominated by the durable good strategy. The monopolist sells seed as a
durable good to farmers who ineﬃciently self-produce. The introduction of a license fee increases
eﬃciency by making self-production less attractive. It therefore renders the nondurable good
strategy more proﬁtable. It also assigns all eﬃciency gains to the monopoly. At the limit, when
the license fee is equal to the one-period monopoly mark-up (i.e., the monopoly price net of
marginal cost), it allows the monopolist to extract all of the surplus.
The introduction of hybrid seed in our analysis yields a number of interesting results. First, if
the monopolist cannot produce both inbred line and hybrid seed (thus either switching to hybrid
seed production or continuing to produce inbred line seed), we show that she has an incentive to
introduce technologically dominated hybrid seed (i.e., hybrid seed less productive than inbred
line seed) in order to extract more surplus from farmers. She, indeed, decides to ineﬃciently
shorten the durability of the crop. Furthermore, the license fee reduces the incentive for the
monopolist to switch to ineﬃcient hybrid seed. Yet the monopolist switches to hybrid when it
is eﬃcient to do so, only for a license fee equal to the one-period monopoly mark-up. Second, if
the monopolist can produce the two types of seed, we show that she sells both technologically
4dominated hybrid seed and inbred line seed to discriminate among farmers.
Finally, we introduce duopoly price competit i o nb e t w e e na ni n b r e dl i n es e e dp r o d u c e ra n d
a hybrid seed producer. When hybrid seed is less eﬃcient than inbred line seed, we show
that it leads to a diﬀerentiated market structure with both types of seeds. This equilibrium
is ineﬃcient, because some farmers self-produce, whereas the rest of them use technologically
dominated hybrid seeds. The license fee has no impact on eﬃciency or on the inbred line seed
monopoly proﬁt.
As a ﬁnal introductory point, it is important to keep in mind that royalties on crop traits
are motivated by property rights on innovations. The goal of such regulation is that the seed
producer gets a full return on his investment in R&D leading to new crop traits, e.g., the
monopoly proﬁt yields from a nondurable trait. Accordingly, in our article we examine the
impact of such regulation, not only on seed producer proﬁt, but also on the ex post eﬃciency of
the entire society.
Further, we restrict ourselves to the study of the monopoly and diﬀerentiated duopoly cases
because IPRs favor market power, and also because, in our framework, perfect competition
leads to ex post eﬃciency. In other words, ex post ineﬃciencies are due to the exercise of market
power. However, ex ante eﬃciency might require ex post market power due to strong IPRs to
foster innovation.
Our contribution is related to the literature on durable goods. The Coase conjecture states
that monopoly pricing of durable goods leads to exhaustion of the monopoly rent. This is due
t ot h ef a c tt h a tt h em o n o p o l i s tc a n n o tc o m m i tt o not reduce prices in the future to attract
the residual demand. The monopolist would like to commit on high prices (e.g., the monopoly
price), but then is tempted to cut prices to attract the residual demand until it reaches its
marginal cost. Expecting this behavior, consumers will buy at marginal cost, at most (Coase,
1972; Bulow, 1982; Gul, Sonnenschein and Wilson, 1986; Waldman, 2003). Here the problem is
diﬀerent. First, the good can be sold during each period as a nondurable good to be used by
farmers for only one period. This is indeed what the monopolist would like to do. She must
then commit to setting low prices in the future. Second, since farmers must save and stock
part of their harvest to self-produce seed, their choice to render the good durable occurs before
observing future prices. Those who have not saved some crop become captive demand: they
have no choice but to buy the seed again. The monopolist is thus tempted to increase her price
5in the future to hold-up these farmers. Expecting this behavior, all farmers save part of their
harvest and self-produce. Therefore, conversely to the standard durable good problem, the lack
of commitment on future prices leads to a higher (and not lower) price in the future.
Shortening crop trait durability is similar to the planned obsolescence of durable goods
(Bulow, 1986; Waldman, 1996). Bulow (1986) has formalized the monopoly’s incentive to un-
economically shorten the durability of goods in a two-period model. Our framework is diﬀerent
in two ways. First, we deal with a good that leaves the option to consumers to make it durable
at a cost. The monopolist wants to introduce an uneconomical good that does not provide
this option. Second, consumers have heterogeneous beneﬁts captured by seed production costs
when they have the option to make the good durable. As a consequence, for some values of the
parameters, the monopolist chooses to produce both types of seed to diﬀerentiate consumers.
Our contribution is also related to the literature on the impact of IPRs within the seed
industry. Burton et al. (2005) examine the property rights protection of genetically modiﬁed
(GM) crops in a two-period model. They compare sterile GM seeds with short term and long
term contracts between the seed producer and farmers as strategies to protect IPRs. Their focus
is mainly on the enforcement and monitoring problems with long term contracts that can be
avoided with sterile GM seeds. Perrin and Fulginiti (2004) investigate the pricing of diﬀerent
types of seeds under diﬀerent property rights regimes in a model close to that of Bulow (1982).
Finally, several contributions analyze the impact of IPRs within the seed industry on the
incentives to enhance innovation. Their focus is on the standard trade-oﬀ between ex ante
(stronger IPRs create more incentive to invest in research) versus ex post (deadweight loss due
to market power) eﬃciency and the diﬀerence between inbred line and hybrid seed is captured
through diﬀerent levels of a property rights parameter (Alston and Venner; 2002, Lence et al.,
2005).2 Our analysis complements the above contributions in that the choice of the type of seed
is endogenous, while the preliminary research stage is exogenous. Further, we study the impact
of license fees paid by farmers who self-produce.3
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 2. Section 3 is devoted
2van Tongeren and Eaton (2004) and Kesan and Gallo (2005) also address this issue in the context of developing
countries.
3Kesan and Gallo (2005) analyze the impact of such a royalty on the incentive to invest in research, but not
on the choice of the type of seed.
6to the analysis of the inbred line seed monopoly model. We study pricing strategies in the case
of commitment on future prices and in the non-commitment case. Then we investigate how the
introduction of license fees aﬀects our ﬁndings. Section 4 focuses on the introduction of hybrid
seed. We ﬁrst consider that the monopolist can only decide to switch to hybrid seed production.
We investigate how this new strategy alters the monopoly’s behavior. We then allow for multi-
seed production, and thus investigate whether the monopolist chooses to produce one or both
types of seed. In section 5 we analyze a situation in which a ﬁrm produces only inbred line seed,
and a competitor can enter the market with hybrid seed. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We consider a two-period model in which seed producers face a continuum of farmers of mass
1. The discount factor is normalized to 1. Each farmer buys zero or one units of seed. A
monopolist produces and sells inbred line seeds (L)a tam a r g i n a lc o s tn o r m a l i z e dt ob e0.A s
the technology becomes available (at no cost), she (or another seed dealer) may also produce
a n ds e l lh y b r i ds e e d s( H)a tah i g h e rm a r g i n a lc o s tc>0.T h eg r o s sp a y o ﬀ of the farmer from
using inbred line seed or hybrid seed is Πj (with j = H,L) and is identical for all of the farmers.
We suppose that ΠH > ΠL, so that hybrid seeds generate higher a payoﬀ but are more costly
to produce. Yet we assume that it is worthwhile to use hybrids, i.e., ΠH − c>0.
Not only do the two types of seed have diﬀerent costs and proﬁts, they also diﬀer in their
durability. Unlike hybrid seed, the inbred line harvest (i.e., the output) can be saved and used
to produce seed for the next period’s production (as an input). If a farmer buys inbred line
seeds at the beginning of the ﬁrst period, he produces his own second-period seeds at a cost θ
that includes the cost of saving part of the harvest. Importantly, farmers diﬀer in their costs
of producing inbred line seeds. We assume that θ is distributed according to some density f(θ)
with cumulative function F(θ) on [0,θ],w h e r eF(0) = 0 and F(θ)=1 .T h u s ,F(θ) is the fraction
of farmers with a cost less than θ. To simplify, we assume that the distribution is uniform and
that θ ≤ ΠL.
In our setting, since the seed producer’s marginal cost of producing the inbred line is zero,
self-production by farmers is socially ineﬃcient. In other words, at the ﬁrst-best, all seeds are
produced by seed producers. Moreover, only one type of seed should be produced at the ﬁrst-
7best. To see this, let us consider that a social planner can choose prices and decide on whether
to switch to hybrid seeds or to stay with inbred line seeds. He sets the price equal to marginal
cost, i.e., zero for inbred line seeds and c for hybrid seeds. Consequently, the two-period welfare
is 2ΠL if inbred line seeds are produced and 2(ΠH −c) if hybrid seeds are produced. Hence, the
social planner switches to hybrid seed if ΠH −c ≥ ΠL or equivalently, ΠH − ΠL ≡ ∆Π ≥ c;i . e . ,
the harvest gain compensates the incremental cost of producing hybrid line seeds.
Furthermore, it is worth noting that in our setting, the ﬁrst-best outcome could be achieved
with perfect competition in the inbred line seed market, and with a monopoly setting in the
hybrid seed market. The logic here is straightforward. Inbred line seed producers set their price
at marginal cost zero (as in the case of price setting by a social planner). Farmers buy during
each period, as it would be more costly to self-produce (θ ≥ 0). In order to enter the market, a
hybrid seed producer has to set his price at ∆Π (such that ΠH −p = ΠL) or possibly just below.
If ∆Π <c , the hybrid seed producer does not enter and only inbred line seeds are produced. On
the other hand, if ∆Π ≥ c, the hybrid seed producer enters and only hybrid seeds are produced.
In this latter case, all of the farmers buy the hybrid seeds, and the (maximized) total surplus
is shared between the farmers and the hybrid seed producer. Furthermore, hybrid seeds are
eﬃciently produced. Therefore, any loss of eﬃciency in seed pricing or in the reduction of trait
durability is due to the exercise of market power in the inbred line seed industry.
3 Inbred line monopoly
W eb e g i nw i t hab e n c h m a r ka n a l y s i si nw h i c ham onopolist sells only inbred line seed. We
investigate her pricing decisions when she can and when she cannot commit in the ﬁrst period
to the second-period price. Assuming that the monopolist can commit on the second-period
price is equivalent to assuming that farmers observe this price before deciding to self-produce.
This assumption depends on the context. For instance, wheat in France is generally harvested
in July and August, and seed for next production cycle is sown either a couple of months later
or during the next spring. In the ﬁrst case of a short time lag between the harvest and the
planting, farmers can stockpile part of their harvest and choose whether or not to use it for
planting after observing seed prices. This corresponds to the commitment case. In the second
case, farmers have to stockpile for a longer period and this alternative is costly, even if they can
8sell their stock of seeds on the spot market. This corresponds to the non-commitment case.
We ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium when the monopoly can commit in the ﬁrst period to the
second-period price, and we then investigate the non-commitment case. Finally, we analyze the
eﬀect of license fees on pricing strategy and welfare.
3.1 Commitment on second-period price
In the commitment case, the timing of events is as follows. In the ﬁrst period, the monopolist
oﬀers a pair of prices {p1L,p 2L},w h e r ep1L (respectively, p2L)i st h eﬁrst-period (respectively,
second-period) price. The farmers observe these prices, each decides whether or not to buy the
seed at price p1L, and then each decides whether or not to self-produce for the second period. In
the second period, those who did not save part of the harvest in the ﬁr s tp e r i o dh a v et od e c i d e
whether to buy the seed at price p2L.
To fully understand the monopoly’s pricing strategy, we ﬁrst consider what happens in the
case of homogeneous farmers, i.e., when they all have the same cost θ. While committing on a
price schedule, the monopolist can adopt two diﬀerent strategies. Either she sells the seed as
a “durable good” in the ﬁrst period to be used for the two periods, and therefore sells nothing
in the second period (the “durable good” strategy), or rather, she sells the seed during the
two periods (the “nondurable good” strategy). In the case of the durable good strategy, the
ﬁrst-period price is equal to the two-period seed value,4 namely p1L =2 ΠL−θ. The monopolist
gets the entire surplus, whereas the farmers get nothing. However, since seeds are ineﬃciently
self-produced by farmers, the total surplus can be increased if the monopolist sells seeds in the
second period. In this case (the nondurable good strategy), in the second period the monopolist
faces competition from farmers that forces the second-period price to be equal to the farmers’
costs, i.e., p2L = θ (if higher, farmers produce their own seed). In the ﬁrst period, the monopolist
exerts her full market power by selling the one-period seed at its one-period value, i.e., p1L = ΠL.
The total surplus is maximized, but it is shared between the monopolist, who gets (ΠL + θ),
and farmers, who get (ΠL − θ). The monopolist has to choose between an ineﬃcient outcome
(durable good strategy), where she gets all of the surplus, and an eﬃcient one (nondurable good
strategy), where she shares the surplus. Her choice between the two above pricing strategies
4The second-period price is set high enough (e.g., p2L >θ ) to induce farmers to self-produce seeds.
9depends upon the level of the farmers’ self-production costs, θ. Therefore, she adopts the durable
good strategy and only sells in the ﬁrst period (respectively, the nondurable good strategy and
sells during the two periods) when θ ≤ ΠL/2 (respectively, θ>ΠL/2).
We then turn to what happens when farmers are heterogeneous in their self-production cost
θ. In this case, the monopolist faces a similar trade-oﬀ: either she oﬀers the seed as a durable
good (to be used in the two periods), or she oﬀers the seed during the two periods as a nondurable
good. We now give the details of these two strategies.
First, a durable good monopolist sets her prices so as to sell to self-producing farmers in
the ﬁrst period, and to the others (if any) in the second period. The second period price is the
farmer’s reservation price p2L = ΠL. A farmer whose self-production cost is θ buys in the ﬁrst
period if ΠL −p1L +ΠL −θ ≥ 0. Hence, there exists a farmer who is indiﬀerent between buying
or not, i.e., whose self-production cost is e θ =2 ΠL − p1L as long as e θ ≤ ¯ θ. The monopoly’s







0 f(θ)dθ + ΠL
R ¯ θ
h θ f(θ)dθ
subject to e θ =m i n {2ΠL − p1L,¯ θ}.
(1)
If ¯ θ>ΠL/2, there exists an interior solution: in the ﬁrst period the monopolist sells to self-
producing farmers (those with θ ≤ ΠL/2)a tp r i c ep1L =3 ΠL/2, and in the second period, she
sells to the rest of the farmers at price p2L = ΠL. The monopoly two-period payoﬀ is therefore
ΠL +Π2
L/4¯ θ. At the same time, each farmer whose cost is θ ≥ ΠL/2 (who buys only during the
ﬁrst period and self-produces) gets a payoﬀ of ΠL/2−θ, while the others (who buy only during
the second period at price ΠL) get zero. The farmers’ total surplus is Π2
L/8¯ θ. The loss of welfare
is due to (i) ineﬃcient self-production from farmers θ ≤ ΠL/2 for a total cost Π2
L/8¯ θ and (ii)
no production in the ﬁrst period for farmers θ>ΠL/2, which yields to a loss of Π2
L − Π2
L/2¯ θ.
The total welfare is therefore ΠL +3 Π2
L/8¯ θ.5
If ¯ θ ≤ ΠL/2, the solution is a corner solution: in the ﬁrst period the monopolist sells to all of
the farmers at price p1L =2 ΠL −¯ θ, and to none of them in the second period. The monopoly’s
payoﬀ is 2ΠL −¯ θ, whereas each farmer whose cost is θ gets a payoﬀ of ¯ θ −θ.T h ef a r m e r s ’t o t a l
surplus is thus ¯ θ −E[θ]=¯ θ/2. The total welfare is 2ΠL −¯ θ/2, and therefore, the welfare loss is
the expected cost ¯ θ/2 (recall that the ﬁrst-best welfare is 2ΠL).
5The total welfare can be computed by subtracting the total loss Π
2




L/2¯ θ from the ﬁrst-best
welfare 2ΠL or by adding the monopolist’s and the farmers’ surplus, respectively ΠL + Π
2
L/4¯ θ and Π
2
L/8¯ θ.
10Second, a nondurable good monopolist sells the seeds during the two periods. In the second
period, only farmers with a self-production cost higher than the second period price p2L buy the
seeds. In this setting, two constraints must be satisﬁed: the monopolist must make sure that
farmers buy in the ﬁrst period (ΠL − p1L ≥ 0) and that some farmers buy in the second period
(ΠL − p2L ≥ ΠL − θ). Hence, the nondurable good monopoly program is
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






subject to ΠL − p1L ≥ 0,
e θ =m i n {p2L,¯ θ}.
The optimal prices are therefore p1L = ΠL and p2L = ¯ θ/2. The monopolist sells to all of the
farmers in the ﬁrst period and to only half of them (i.e., those whose θ is larger than ¯ θ/2)i n
the second period. She makes a proﬁto fΠL + ¯ θ/4.
In any case, the durable good strategy dominates the nondurable good strategy, as the
monopolist gets a higher payoﬀ from choosing the durable good strategy. Indeed, if ¯ θ>ΠL/2
(respectively, ¯ θ ≤ ΠL/2), the durable good payoﬀ is greater than the nondurable good payoﬀ,
ΠL + Π2
L/4¯ θ>ΠL + ¯ θ/4 (respectively, 2ΠL − ¯ θ>ΠL + ¯ θ/4), as long as ¯ θ ≤ ΠL (respectively,
¯ θ<4ΠL/5). By assumption, ¯ θ ≤ ΠL,a n d¯ θ<4ΠL/5 is always satisﬁed for ¯ θ ≤ ΠL/2.
Therefore, she only sells seed in the ﬁrst period, but to all of the farmers. This leads to an
ineﬃcient outcome, as all of the farmers ineﬃciently self-produce in the second period.
3.2 No commitment on second-period price
We now consider what happens when the monopolist cannot commit on future prices or, equiv-
alently, when the farmers observe the second-period price after deciding whether to self-produce
or not. Therefore, the timing of events is now diﬀerent, and is the following. The ﬁrst period
consists of three stages. First, the monopolist sets the ﬁrst-period price, p1L. Second, the farm-
ers observe this price and each of them decides whether or not to buy inbred line seeds. Third,
each farmer decides whether or not to save some seed to self-produce in the second period. The
second period consists of two stages. First, the monopolist sets the second-period price, p2L.
Second, the farmers observe this new price, and those who did not self-produce have to decide
whether or not to buy seeds. In the absence of any commitment device, we solve the two-period
model backward and we determine the Subgame Perfect Nash equilibrium.
11First, consider the case of homogenous farmers, where all of the farmers have the same self-
production cost θ. With commitment on future prices, we already know that the monopolist
chooses the nondurable good strategy if θ>ΠL/2. She sells seed during the two periods to all of
the farmers at prices p1L = ΠL and p2L = θ, respectively. When the monopolist cannot commit
on future prices, the nondurable good strategy is not subgame perfect: she is tempted to raise
the second-period price from θ to ΠL. Furthermore, farmers face a hold-up problem. The logic
is the following. In the second period, farmers who did not save their harvest to self-produce
become captive consumers. Therefore, the monopolist can set her second-period price equal
to the seed value, ΠL. Expecting that price, none of the farmers buy the second-period seed.
Indeed, they are better oﬀ if they self-produce, as ΠL − p2L < ΠL − θ is always satisﬁed when
p2L = ΠL. A lower second-period price will induce farmers not to save, and thus, to buy from
the monopoly in the second period. However, this cannot be an equilibrium, as the monopolist
will always be tempted to raise her second period price up to ΠL, forcing farmers to buy at this
price. Anticipating this behavior, all of the farmers who bought seed in the ﬁrst period will save
seed in the ﬁrst period for second-period production.
We now turn to the heterogeneous case where θ is uniformly distributed on [0,¯ θ].W i t h
commitment on future prices, the durable good strategy dominates the nondurable good strat-
egy. The committed second-period price is the subgame perfect second-period price p2L = ΠL.
Therefore, the equilibrium prices of the commitment game are also those of the non-commitment
game. The outcome is thus the same. It is ineﬃcient because some farmers self-produce seed
ineﬃciently (all of the farmers if p1L =2 ΠL −¯ θ) and some produce only in the second period if
p1L =3 ΠL/2.
We now examine the impact of a royalty fee on the monopolist’s strategy. For expositional
simplicity,6 we focus on the case where ¯ θ ≤ ΠL/2.
3.3 Monopoly pricing strategy with license fees
As mentioned in the introduction, following a new E.U. directive, farmers who self-produce
must pay a tax that is assigned to the seed producer. Thus we investigate the impact on the
monopoly pricing strategy of a given license fee τ paid by farmers who self-produce. We assume
that 0 <τ≤ ΠL and ¯ θ ≤ ΠL/2.
6For ¯ θ>ΠL/2, we obtain qualitatively similar results.
12If the monopolist chooses the durable good strategy, the imposition of a license fee does not
change our ﬁndings. Indeed, the monopolist simply accounts for the license fee in her program.
The price paid by farmers, p1L + τ,i se q u a lt o2ΠL − ¯ θ, and thus, the monopoly proﬁti s
unchanged, 2ΠL − ¯ θ.
However, the imposition of a license fee makes self-production more costly, and makes the
nondurable good strategy more attractive for the monopolist. To see this, consider the non-
commitment case. As before, the lack of commitment implies that the second-period price will
be the highest possible, namely p2L = ΠL. Expecting this price, and with the imposition of
license fees, some farmers will no longer self-produce seeds. Figure 1 illustrates this result.
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Farmers with low self-production costs, i.e., θ<ΠL −τ, still prefer to self-produce and only
earn ΠL − τ − θ,w h e r eτ is transferred to the monopoly in the second period. Farmers with
high self-production costs earn a negative proﬁt by self-producing, and consequently prefer to
buy seeds in the second period at price p2L = ΠL. Some farmers prefer to buy seed only if
the license fee is high enough (i.e., τ>ΠL − ¯ θ). When choosing the nondurable good strategy
the monopoly two-period payoﬀ is 2ΠL −(ΠL −τ)2/¯ θ (by using ﬁgure 1 it is straightforward to
determine the proﬁt; the formal proof is relegated to the appendix).
The monopolist prefers to sell seed as a nondurable good as soon as some farmers are willing
to buy seed at the second-period price p2L = ΠL. Or, in other words, when the level of the
license fee is high enough, i.e., τ>ΠL − ¯ θ. If this condition is fulﬁlled, the monopolist gains
more by adopting a nondurable good strategy than a durable good strategy, not only from the
farmers who self-produce, but also from those who buy in the second period. The logic is as
follows. First, consider a farmer who self-produces. If the monopolist chooses a durable good
strategy, she earns 2ΠL − ¯ θ − τ + τ per unit by setting a ﬁrst-period price of 2ΠL − ¯ θ − τ.I f
she chooses the nondurable good strategy, she earns ΠL + τ per unit by setting a ﬁrst-period
price of ΠL. As the license fee increases, the ﬁrst-period price of a durable good monopoly
decreases, whereas the ﬁrst-period price of a nondurable good monopoly does not vary. As long
as τ>ΠL − ¯ θ, the nondurable good strategy yields a higher payoﬀ. Second, consider a farmer
who buys seed in the second period when the seed is sold as a nondurable good. The durable
13good monopolist still earns 2ΠL −¯ θ, and the nondurable good monopolist earns the full surplus
2ΠL. Therefore, if τ>ΠL − ¯ θ a nondurable good monopolist earns more from farmers who
self-produce (ΠL + τ>2ΠL − ¯ θ) and also from those who buy (2ΠL > 2ΠL − ¯ θ).
The choice of the nondurable good strategy leads to an increase in the total surplus, since
ineﬃcient farmers with high self-production costs buy seed that is eﬃciently produced. The
increase in surplus is due to the saved self-production cost θ from farmers who no longer self-
produce and from an increase in monopoly proﬁto f¯ θ (increase in price and tax over the two
periods). Hence, the increase in the monopoly proﬁt from the introduction of a signiﬁcant tax
is greater than the increase in total surplus.
In the extreme case, where τ = ΠL, the monopolist extracts all of the surplus. Only farmers
with null production costs self-produce and pay royalties. All of the other farmers buy seed
during each period at the one-period monopoly price ΠL.7
To summarize (see ﬁgure 2), for low values of the fee, i.e., τ ∈ (0,ΠL − ¯ θ], the monopolist
adopts the durable good strategy and sells seed only in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da tp r i c e2ΠL − ¯ θ − τ.
She makes a proﬁto f2ΠL − ¯ θ, and farmers get a surplus of ¯ θ/2. Therefore, the total surplus
is 2ΠL − ¯ θ/2. For higher values of the fee, i.e., τ ∈ [ΠL − ¯ θ,ΠL], the monopolist adopts the
nondurable good strategy and sells seed during both periods at prices p1L = p2L = ΠL. She
gets a proﬁto f2ΠL − (ΠL − τ)2/¯ θ, and farmers get a surplus equal to what they save by self-
producing, (ΠL − τ)2/2¯ θ. The total surplus is then 2ΠL − (ΠL − τ)2/2¯ θ.T h ei n e ﬃciency loss
due to self-production is therefore (ΠL − τ)2/2¯ θ.
Insert ﬁgure 2
We sum up the previous analysis in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 By reducing self-production, a license fee τ>ΠL − ¯ θ increases eﬃciency and
transfers more than the eﬃciency gain to the monopolist. When τ = ΠL,e ﬃciency is restored
and the monopolist gets all of the surplus.
7License fees are distributed to all through lump-sum subsidies, the eﬃciency gains are then more equitably
shared. Although it is not the purpose of this regulation that is intended to provide the seed producer a return
on her investment in R&D, such a redistribution might be more acceptable from the farmers’ viewpoint.
144 Introduction of hybrid seed
We now consider that hybrid seed becomes available exclusively to the monopolist at constant
marginal cost c>0.L e t ptj denote the price charged in period t =1 ,2 for seed j = H,L (if
sold). When given the choice between the two types of seeds, farmers have to decide which
one to buy. If they buy hybrid seed in the ﬁrst period, they cannot use part of the harvest
to self-produce in the second period. Thus, in the second period, they have to buy either the
inbred line seed at price p2L or the hybrid seed at price p2H.
In this setting, we investigate under what circumstances the monopolist decides to switch
to hybrid production, or to produce both inbred line and hybrid seeds at the same time. We
thus investigate whether the inbred line producer introduces technologically dominated hybrid
seed. As a benchmark, we ﬁrst assume that the monopolist can only produce one type of seed
(hybrid or inbred line), e.g., for technological, legal and/or marketing reasons. We then allow
the monopolist to sell both seeds.
4.1 Switching from inbred line seed to hybrid seed
We ﬁrst consider that the monopolist can only produce one type of seed, and can commit on
future prices. In this setting, the timing of events is the following. The ﬁrst period consists of
three stages. First, the monopolist decides whether to switch to hybrid or to keep producing
inbred line seed. Second, she sets the seed prices accordingly. Third, farmers observe the prices,
as well as the type of seed produced, and decide to buy or not. They also decide whether to
save part of their harvest for self-production for the next period if inbred line seed are produced.
In the second period, if inbred line seed is produced, farmers who did not save seeds have to
decide whether to buy or not. If hybrid seeds are produced, farmers have no choice but to buy
the seed in the second period.
If the monopolist switches to hybrid seed in the ﬁrst period, she behaves as a nondurable
good monopolist, and thus, sets the monopoly price in each period, i.e., p1H = p2H = ΠH.
None of the farmers can use their own seed for the next period, and they all buy seeds at their
valuation, ΠH. The two-period beneﬁt of the monopoly is, therefore, 2(ΠH − c),a n df a r m e r s
get a null beneﬁt. Note that in this case, whether the monopolist can or cannot commitment
on future prices does not matter.
15If the monopolist keeps producing inbred line seed, we know from the previous section that
she adopts the durable good strategy. Her two-period payoﬀ is 2ΠL − ¯ θ. Thus, the monopolist
switches to hybrid seed in the ﬁrst period8 if c ≤ ∆Π + ¯ θ/2. However, from a social viewpoint,
hybrids should be produced only if c<∆Π + ¯ θ/4.
Depending on the value of c,f o u ra r e a sc a nb ed e ﬁned (see Figure 3 for τ =0 ). (1) If c<∆Π,
the monopolist switches to hybrid seed, which is also the most eﬃcient technology (ﬁrst-best
choice). (2) If c ∈ [∆Π,∆Π + ¯ θ/4], the dominated hybrid seed is produced. This is because by
avoiding self-production, hybrid technology allows the monopolist to extract all of the surplus,
even if this is less eﬃcient. This switch is eﬃcient (i.e., leads to a higher surplus than the surplus
gained from the inbred line seed) in a monopoly framework because the price schedule with inbred
line seed leads farmers to ineﬃciently self-produce seed. (3) If c ∈ [∆Π + ¯ θ/4,∆Π + ¯ θ/2],t h e
dominated hybrid seed is still produced, for the same reason as in (2). However, this switch
is now ineﬃcient, as hybrid seed is becoming excessively ineﬃcient, even if it avoids ineﬃcient
self-production. (4) If c>∆Π + ¯ θ/2, the monopolist keeps producing inbred line seed, which
corresponds to an eﬃcient choice.
Insert ﬁgure 3
We sum up this result in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 If c ∈ [∆Π,∆Π + ¯ θ/2], the monopolist switches to technologically dominated
hybrid seed. This switch is eﬃcient as long as c ≤ ∆Π + ¯ θ/4.
We now investigate whether the introduction of license fees can provide the monopolist with
incentives to switch to hybrid seed when it is eﬃcient to do so. Figure 3 represents how the four
areas described earlier are aﬀected by the license fee.
When τ ∈ (0,ΠL − ¯ θ], we already know that the introduction of a license fee has no eﬀect
on the monopoly equilibrium, including prices, proﬁts and welfare. Therefore, a small fee τ
cannot give enough incentive to switch to hybrid seed. For τ ∈ [ΠL − ¯ θ,ΠL], the inbred line
8We can think of a situation where the monopolist switches to hybrid seed production only in the second
period (i.e., after producing inbred line seed in the ﬁrst period). However, this strategy is obviously dominated
from the seed producer’s viewpoint.
16monopolist chooses the nondurable good strategy. The proﬁt and the total welfare derived in
the previous section (that both depend on τ) can be used to examine the monopolist’s switching
strategy. She switches to hybrids when c ≤ ∆Π +( ΠL − τ)2/2¯ θ (areas 1, 2 and 3), which is
eﬃcient only for c ≤ ∆Π +( ΠL − τ)2/4¯ θ (areas 1 and 2). The “ineﬃciency area” (area 3) in
which the monopolist switches to hybrid seed, although it is eﬃcient to keep producing inbred
line seed, shrinks as τ increases. This is because a higher license fee increases the proﬁto f
the inbred line seed monopoly and, therefore, makes the switch to dominated hybrid seed less
attractive. Yet this ineﬃciency area exists as long as τ<ΠL, meaning that imposing a license
fee does not always provide incentives to eﬃciently switch. The monopolist switches at the
eﬃcient threshold level only for the extreme value τ = ΠL. This corresponds to the case where
there is no eﬃciency loss due to self-production and the monopolist gets all of the surplus from
inbred line seed production. We summarize these ﬁndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The introduction of a license fee makes the monopolist switch ineﬃciently to
hybrids less often. She always switches eﬃciently only when the license fee allows her to capture
all of the surplus with inbred line seeds, i.e., τ = ΠL.
4.2 Multi-seed production
We now analyze what happens when the monopolist can sell both types of seeds. If hybrid seed
is more eﬃcient than inbred line seed, i.e., c<∆Π, the monopolist has no incentive to sell
both types of seed. She only sells hybrid seed and this has two advantages: it enables making a
higher proﬁt because of higher eﬃciency; it enables the extraction all of the surplus because it is
a nondurable good, in the sense that farmers are captive in the second period. The monopolist
charges prices p1H = p2H = ΠH, and therefore earns 2(ΠH − c), whereas farmers get a null
payoﬀ.
On the other hand, if inbred line seed is more eﬃcient than hybrid seed, i.e., c>∆Π,
the monopolist can introduce ineﬃcient hybrid seed in the ﬁrst period to force farmers to buy
inbred line seed in the second period. To see this, let us study the possible strategies of the
monopolist for each period. In the second period, if the monopolist sells one type of seed, it will
be the inbred line seed at price p2L = ΠL. Indeed, because of our two-period framework, the
monopolist provides only the most eﬃcient seed in the second period, which yields a payoﬀ of
17ΠL that is greater than ΠH − c.I nt h eﬁrst period the picture is more complex. If both types
of seed are provided at prices p1L and p1H, farmers with low self-production costs buy inbred
line seed and self-produce,9 whereas those with high self-production costs buy hybrid seed in
the ﬁrst period and inbred line seed in the second period. A farmer whose self-production cost
is θ chooses the ﬁrst strategy if ΠL − p1L + ΠL − θ ≥ ΠH − p1H + ΠL − p2L or, equivalently, if
θ ≤ 2ΠL − ΠH − p1L + p1H ≡ ˜ θ. Thus, given the second-period price p2L = ΠL, the monopolist
chooses p1L and p1H that solve
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨





0 f(θ)dθ +( p1H − c + ΠL)
R ¯ θ
˜ θ f(θ)dθ
subject to ˜ θ =m i n {2ΠL − ΠH − p1L + p1H,¯ θ},
p1H ≤ ΠH,
p1L >p 1H − ∆Π.
(2)
The last constraint means that the monopolist needs to make sure that no farmer buys inbred
line seed instead of hybrid seed in the ﬁrst period for a one period use only. The price solutions







2(3ΠL + ΠH − c) if c<∆Π +2 ¯ θ,
2ΠL − ¯ θ if c ≥ ∆Π +2 ¯ θ.
To summarize, a multi-seed monopolist adopts the following pricing strategies. When c ∈
[∆Π,∆Π +2 ¯ θ], she sells both inbred line and hybrid seeds at respective prices p1L =( 3 ΠL +
ΠH − c)/2 and p1H = ΠH in the ﬁr s tp e r i o d ,a n do n l yi n b r e dl i n es e e di nt h es e c o n dp e r i o d
at price p2L = ΠL.F a r m e r s w i t h c o s t θ ≤ ˜ θ =( c − ∆Π)/2 buy inbred line seed in the ﬁrst
period and self-produce in the second period. The rest of the farmers buy hybrid seed in the
ﬁrst period and inbred line seed in the second period. When c ≥ ∆Π +2 ¯ θ, the monopolist sells
only inbred line seed during the two periods at prices p1L =2 ΠL − ¯ θ and p2L = ΠL. Therefore,
all of the farmers self-produce.
Figure 4 is helpful in understanding the gain and loss from the multi-seed strategy (the
formal expressions are derived in the appendix).
9At monopoly prices, the only reason to buy inbred line seed is to exploit its durability.
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The total loss of welfare compared to the ﬁrst-best outcome with only inbred line seed and
no self-production (namely 2ΠL)i s
(c−∆Π)2
8¯ θ +( 1− c−∆Π
2¯ θ )(c − ∆Π). (3)
The ﬁrst term represents the eﬃciency loss due to self-production (area I in ﬁgure 4), whereas
the second term represents the eﬃciency loss due to the use of ineﬃcient hybrid seed (area II
in ﬁgure 4). Furthermore, to determine whether a multi-seed setting situation is eﬃcient, we
need to compare the above loss to the ineﬃciency loss due to self-production from all of the
farmers, ¯ θ/2. Therefore, we ﬁnd that it is eﬃcient to introduce hybrid seed in a monopoly
setting when c ≤ ∆Π +2 ¯ θ/3 (calculations are relegated to the appendix). This leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 4 When the monopolist has the option to sell both hybrid and inbred line seeds
during the same period, she introduces technologically dominated hybrid seed if c ∈ [∆Π,∆Π+2¯ θ].
This is eﬃcient only when c ≤ ∆Π +2 ¯ θ/3.
Even if inbred line seed is more eﬃcient, the monopolist can extract more surplus by also
selling hybrid seed. This is because when she produces only inbred line seed, she serves all of
the demand.10 She thus has to match her price with the less eﬃcient farmers’ willingness to
pay for a durable good ¯ θ. With hybrid seed, she can discriminate among farmers by providing
the less eﬃcient ones (i.e., those with high θ) with hybrid seed, thereby increasing the price for
t h em o r ee ﬃcient ones (i.e., those with low θ). Hence, she increases the rent extracted from the
more eﬃcient farmers.
We now investigate the eﬀect of a license fee on the decision to introduce hybrid seed. We ﬁrst
derive the optimal multi-seed monopoly payoﬀ with a license fee (see appendix for calculation),
and we then compare it with the mono-seed monopoly payoﬀ when only inbred line seed is
produced.
If c<∆Π +2 ¯ θ the solutions are p1L =m a x {(3ΠL + ΠH − c)/2 − τ,ΠL} and p1H = ΠH.
First, if τ<ΠL − (c − ∆Π)/2, the monopoly proﬁti sn o ta ﬀected by the license fee because
10This is the case at least when ¯ θ ≤ ΠL.
19the monopolist decreases the price charged to self-producing farmers by the same amount as the
fee she gets from these farmers when they buy the seed. Second, if τ>ΠL − (c − ∆Π)/2,t h e
optimal inbred line seed price is ΠL. In this case, the monopolist does not use hybrid seed as
a discriminatory device any longer, because she can extract a larger part of the self-producing
farmers’ proﬁts with a high license fee. If the monopolist chooses to sell hybrid seed, she then
chooses a price p1L slightly higher than ΠL.O n l yf a r m e r sw i t hθ ≤ ΠL − τ would self-produce.
The monopoly proﬁt would decrease with τ,as shown in ﬁgure 5. This strategy leads to a lower
proﬁt than when the monopolist chooses a p1L slightly lower than ΠL and produces only inbred
line seed in the ﬁrst period.
Insert ﬁgure 5
If c ≥ ∆Π +2 ¯ θ in the absence of a license fee, the multi-seed monopolist prefers to sell only
inbred line seed as a durable good (p1L =2 ΠL −¯ θ). The situation is, therefore, identical to the
one we studied before, with a monopolist selling only inbred line seed. With the introduction of
license fees, the monopolist still prefers to sell only inbred line seed.
When c<∆Π +2 ¯ θ, in the presence of a license fee, the monopolist can choose either to
introduce the hybrid in the ﬁrst period, or to produce inbred line seed as a nondurable good,
as we have seen in the previous section. We now analyze the monopolist’s decisions. When she
sells both seeds, two cases must be considered, depending on whether τ i ss m a l l e ro rg r e a t e r
than ΠL −(c−∆Π)/2 (see ﬁgure 5). On the other hand, when the monopolist sells only inbred
line seed as a nondurable good, two cases are also possible, depending on whether τ is greater
or smaller than ΠL −¯ θ (see ﬁgure 2). Further, if c<∆Π+2¯ θ,t h e nΠL −¯ θ<ΠL −(c−∆Π)/2,
so that only the three following cases need to be considered.
First, if τ<ΠL − ¯ θ, the license fee does not aﬀect the monopoly payoﬀ or the surplus,
whatever the strategy (hybrid and inbred line seed or only inbred line seed as a nondurable
good). The results are identical to those obtained earlier with no license fee (see proposition 4).
Second, if τ ∈ [ΠL −¯ θ,ΠL −(c−∆Π)/2], the license fee aﬀects the monopoly payoﬀ and the
surplus when only inbred line seed is produced as a nondurable good. The monopolist prefers
to sell both seeds in the ﬁrst period if c<Γ1 (see appendix for details of the calculation). The
20surplus increases when both seeds are produced in the ﬁrst period if c<Γ2 (see appendix for
details of the calculation).
Third, if τ>ΠL −(c−∆Π)/2 (or, equivalently, c>∆Π+2(ΠL −τ)) the monopolist gets a
lower proﬁt from selling both seeds compared to the case where τ<ΠL−(c−∆Π)/2 (see ﬁgure
5) and this level is lower compared to the case where only inbred line seed is sold (the condition
c<Γ1 is never satisﬁed). Hence the monopolist is always better oﬀ if she sells only inbred line
seeds, which is also the situation where the surplus is greater.
Figure 6 provides a synthetic representation of these three cases. The arguments for areas
(1) to (4) are identical to those provided for ﬁgure 3.
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5D i ﬀerentiated duopoly
In this section we consider a duopoly model in which a monopolist produces inbred line seed
and a potential entrant produces hybrid seed. We assume that the inbred line seed producer
cannot produce hybrid seed, for instance, for technical or legal reasons, but that another ﬁrm
can. In this new setting, the two ﬁrms compete with diﬀerent seeds. Each seed producer sets a
price ptj in each period t =1 ,2 for j = H,L, and prices are chosen simultaneously.
Because pricing strategies are diﬀerent once competition is introduced, we investigate whether
technologically dominated seed is still introduced, and why and how it aﬀects eﬃciency. We also
examine the impact of license fees on self-produced seed.
First, if hybrid seed production is a more eﬃcient technology, i.e., c<∆Π, the hybrid
producer excludes the inbred line producer by pricing just below ∆Π during both periods. It is
a monopoly contestable market.
Second, if both seeds are equally eﬃcient for one period, i.e., c = ∆Π,t h eﬁrms compete à
la Bertrand in the second period and set their prices at marginal cost, i.e., p2L =0and p2H = c.
Expecting these prices, no farmers self-produce, since self-production costs exceed seed prices.
Therefore, all of the farmers buy seeds as nondurable goods in the ﬁrst period. Seed producers
compete à la Bertrand in the ﬁrst period and they also set prices at marginal cost.
21Third, if inbred line seeds are more eﬃcient than hybrid seeds, i.e., c>∆Π, the equilibrium
is such that only inbred line seed is produced in the second period. Indeed, in the second
period, the farmers who did not self-produce become captive. Seed producers are in a one-
period Bertrand competition for this captive demand. Since inbred line seed dominates hybrid
seed, the inbred line producer can set a low price to capture all of the demand, p∗
2L = c−∆Π−ε
(with ε close to 0). The hybrid producer has no demand, even if he sets his price at marginal
cost c. Farmers always buy from the inbred line producer, as ΠH −c<ΠL −p∗
2L if they do not
self-produce. However, farmers whose cost θ is lower than p∗
2L = c − ∆Π self-produce.
In the ﬁrst period, seed producers are engaged in a price competition with diﬀerentiated
seeds. Farmers rank seeds according to their self-production costs: those with low θ have a
higher willingness to pay for the durable seed. The inbred line seed producer targets farmers
with low θ, who then self-produce seed, whereas the hybrid producer sells to those with high θ
who buy seeds during each period. Formally, for a given p1L and p1H,f a r m e rθ prefers to buy
inbred line seed and self-produce seed, rather than buying hybrid seed in the ﬁrst period, and
inbred line seed in the second period, if ΠL−p1L+ΠL−θ ≥ ΠH −p1H +ΠL−p2L. Therefore, all
farmers with θ ≤ e θ ≡ min{p1H − p1L + c − 2∆Π,¯ θ} buy inbred line seed. Thus, when choosing





0 f(θ)dθ + p∗
2L
R ¯ θ
h θ f(θ)dθ. (4)
Therefore, she trades ﬁrst period proﬁts for second period proﬁts. By setting a lower ﬁrst-
period price, she attracts more farmers in the ﬁrst period who are willing to self-produce. But
those farmers will not buy seed in the second period, and therefore, the second-period demand
and proﬁt will be reduced. When e θ<¯ θ,t h eﬁrst-order condition yields the inbred line seed
producer’s best response to any price p1H
p1L =
2c − 3∆Π + p1H
2
. (5)






When e θ<¯ θ,t h eﬁrst-order condition yields the hybrid seed producer’s best response to any
22price p1L
p1H =
¯ θ + p1L
2
+ ∆Π. (6)











1H) are the equilibrium prices at which selling at price pe
1H is proﬁtable for the
hybrid seed producer, i.e., pe
1H ≥ c. In the opposite case, if pe
1H <c ,o re q u i v a l e n t l yc>∆Π+2¯ θ,
the hybrid seed producer has no choice but to price at marginal cost pc
1H = c, whereas the inbred
line seed producer chooses her best response to this price, pc
1L =3 ( c −∆Π)/2. The hybrid seed
producer is thus excluded from the market and e θ = ¯ θ. All farmers buy inbred line seed as a
durable good because, since c>∆Π +2 ¯ θ, the second-period price p∗
2L = c − ∆Π is higher than
the highest self-production cost ¯ θ.
To summarize, when ∆Π <c≤ ∆Π+2¯ θ, seed producers compete in prices in a diﬀerentiated
market. Farmers with low self-production costs buy inbred line seed in the ﬁrst period and self-
produce in the second period. Farmers with high self-production costs buy hybrid seed in the
ﬁrst period and inbred line seed in the second period. When c>∆Π +2 ¯ θ, the hybrid seed
producer is excluded from the market. The inbred line seed producer sells seed in the ﬁrst
period to all of the farmers, who then self-produce.
In any case, duopoly pricing leads to ineﬃcient self-production by farmers as long as c>∆Π.
Moreover, farmers who do not self-produce buy technologically dominated hybrid seed, which
is also ineﬃcient. Thus, if c>∆Π, the presence of hybrid seed reduces self-production, but
by detrimentally using an ineﬃcient technology. Moreover, the threat of competition from the
hybrid seed producer in the second period bounds the inbred line second-period price. Thus it
mitigates the hold-up problem highlighted in the inbred line monopoly case, with no commitment
to the beneﬁt of the inbred line producer.
When we investigate the impact of a license fee on seed self-production in this duopoly setting,
we ﬁnd that a fee τ>0 has no impact on seed prices and market structure (see appendix for
details of the calculation).
We summarize the duopoly ﬁndings in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 When ∆Π +2 ¯ θ ≥ c>∆Π in a duopoly setting, the inbred line seed producer
s e l l ss e e da sad u r a b l eg o o dt of a r m e r sw i t hl o ws e lf-production cost, whereas the hybrid seed
23producer sells only to farmers who use seed as a nondurable good. This diﬀerentiated market
structure is ineﬃcient, because self-produced seeds, as well as hybrid seeds, are technologically
dominated. A license fee on self-produced seeds has no impact on the market equilibrium or,
therefore, on its eﬃciency.
6C o n c l u s i o n
By introducing nondurable crops, seed producers can reduce the competition they face from
farmers who self-produce. We analyze the incentives for a monopolist to supply less durable
seed, the welfare implications of the introduction of nondurable goods, and how ineﬃciency can
be restored through the introduction of license fees. In our setting, self-production is ineﬃcient,
because the seed producer has lower production costs than farmers.
We analyze pricing decisions and switching decisions in diﬀerent settings. We ﬁrst consider
a monopoly model in which an inbred line seed producer can decide to switch to hybrid seed.
We show that hybrid seed can be preferred to inbred line seed, even if it is less eﬃcient, in
order to extract more surplus from farmers. The introduction of a license fee allows eﬃciency
to be restored. Second, we consider the incentives for a monopolist to become a multi-seed
producer. Even though hybrid seed is less eﬃcient, the monopolist can decide to produce both
types of seed. The introduction of a license fee can also restore eﬃciency. Lastly, we consider the
situation in which an inbred line monopolist faces potential entry by a hybrid producer. In this
duopoly setting, the monopolist has an incentive to let the hybrid producer enter the market in
order to create diﬀerentiation. In this last case, the introduction of a license fee has no eﬀect on
pricing strategies.
Within a simple framework, we attempt to provide an explanation of why producers may
have some incentives to reduce crop trait durability, even though it is not eﬃcient to do so. We
show that the monopolist may introduce a nondurable good for strategic purposes.
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1. Monopoly pricing strategy with royalty
When the monopolist charges a price equal to ΠL during each period, and farmers with
self-production costs higher than b θτ = ΠL − τ buy seeds in the second period, the two period
















˜ θ(2ΠL − ΠH + p1H − ˜ θ)+( ¯ θ − ˜ θ)(p1H − c + ΠL))
i
.
Note that it is equivalent to maximizing the objective function on ˜ θ instead of p1L, so that the
monopoly’s program becomes
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨






¯ θ(p1H + ΠL − c)+˜ θ(ΠL − ΠH + c − ˜ θ)
i
subject to p1L =2 ΠL − ΠH − ˜ θ + p1H,
0 ≤ ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ,
p1H ≤ ΠH,
p1L >p 1H − ∆Π.
The solutions are p1H = ΠH and ˜ θ =m i n {(c − ∆Π)/2,¯ θ}.I f 1
2(c − ∆Π) < ¯ θ, the upward
constraint on ˜ θ is not binding, and therefore, p1L =( 3 ΠL + ΠH − c)/2. Further, it is easy to
check that p1L >p 1H − ∆Π = ΠL,a s∆Π +2 ¯ θ<ΠL + ΠH.O t h e r w i s e , i f (c − ∆Π)/2 ≥ ¯ θ,
it is binding, and thus, the monopoly sells only inbred line seed in the ﬁr s tp e r i o da tp r i c e
p1L =2 ΠL − ¯ θ. Note that since, by assumption, c − ∆Π > 0, the downward constraint on ˜ θ is
never binding. Here again, it is easy to check that p1L > ΠL,a s2ΠL − ¯ θ>ΠL.
2.1. Producer’s proﬁt and farmers’ surplus with multi-seed monopoly
With a multi-seed monopoly, farmers whose self-production cost is smaller than ˜ θ get a
surplus ˜ θ−θ by buying inbred line seed and self-producing, whereas farmers with a cost of θ ≥ ˜ θ
buy both hybrid and inbred line seed and make no proﬁt. As a consequence, the monopolist
25extracts all of the surplus ΠH from farmers who buy hybrid seed, but incurs a production cost
c, and therefore loses c−∆Π when compared to inbred line seed sold at price ΠL. On the other
hand, she shares the surplus from those who buy inbred line seed as a durable good. Overall,
the proﬁt of the monopolist is (c −∆Π)2/4¯ θ +2ΠL −(c −∆Π),a n df o rf a r m e r s ,(c −∆Π)2/8¯ θ.
The total surplus is therefore 3(c − ∆Π)2/8¯ θ +2 ΠL − (c − ∆Π).
2.2. Ineﬃciency of multi-seed monopoly situation
The loss of eﬃciency as deﬁned by (3) must be compared to ¯ θ/2. A multi-seed monopolist
situation is eﬃcient as
(c−∆Π)2
8¯ θ +( 1− c−∆Π
2¯ θ )(c − ∆Π) −
¯ θ
2 ≤ 0,
⇒− 3(c − ∆Π)2 +8 ¯ θ(c − ∆Π) − 4¯ θ
2 ≤ 0.
We denote X = c−∆Π, and thus, we need to deﬁne for what values of X, −3X2+8¯ θX−4¯ θ
2 ≤ 0.
This last inequality is satisﬁed as long as X ≤ 2¯ θ/3 or X ≥ 2¯ θ,o re q u i v a l e n t l yc ≤ ∆Π +2 ¯ θ/3
and c ≥ ∆Π+2¯ θ. As the monopolist chooses to produce both seeds if c ≤ ∆Π+2¯ θ,i ti se ﬃcient
to introduce hybrid seed as long as c ≤ ∆Π +2 ¯ θ/3.
2.3. Multi-seed monopoly and license fee
The indiﬀerent farmer is now ˜ θ =2 ΠL − ΠH − (p1L + τ)+p1H and the monopolist solves
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨





0 f(θ)dθ +( p1H − c + ΠL)
R ¯ θ
˜ θ f(θ)dθ
subject to ˜ θ =m i n {2ΠL − ΠH − (p1L + τ)+p1H,¯ θ}
p1H ≤ ΠH,
p1L >p 1H − ∆Π.
If c<∆Π +2 ¯ θ the constraint 0 ≤ ˜ θ ≤ ¯ θ is not binding, and the solutions are p1L =
max{(3ΠL + ΠH − c)/2 − τ,ΠL} and p1H = ΠH.F i r s t ,i fτ<ΠL − (c − ∆Π)/2,t h eo p t i m a l
inbred line seed price satisﬁe st h el a s tc o n s t r a i n t( i . e . ,(3ΠL + ΠH − c)/2 − τ>p 1H − ∆Π).
Second, if τ>ΠL −(c−∆Π)/2, the constraint p1L ≥ p1H −∆Π is binding, so that the optimal
inbred line seed price is ΠL.
2.4. Threshold levels Γ1 and Γ2
The monopolist’s proﬁt if she chooses to produce both seeds in the ﬁrst period is (c −
∆Π)2/4¯ θ +2 ΠL − (c − ∆Π), whereas her proﬁt if she produces only inbred line seed as a
26nondurable good is 2ΠL − (ΠL − τ)2/¯ θ. She chooses to produce both if
(c−∆Π)2
4¯ θ +2 ΠL − (c − ∆Π) > 2ΠL −
(ΠL−τ)2
¯ θ ,
⇒ (c − ∆Π)2 − 4¯ θ(c − ∆Π)+4 ( ΠL − τ)2 > 0.
We denote, as before, X = c−∆Π, and therefore, we need to deﬁne the conditions under which
X2 −4¯ θX +4 (ΠL −τ)2 > 0. This inequality is satisﬁed as long as X<2¯ θ −2
q
¯ θ
2 − (ΠL − τ)2
or X>2¯ θ +2
q
¯ θ
2 − (ΠL − τ)2. The last inequality never holds, whereas the ﬁrst one can be
simpliﬁed to c<Γ1 ≡ ∆Π +2 ¯ θ − 2
q
¯ θ
2 − (ΠL − τ)2.
The total welfare in the case of a multi-seed monopoly is 3(c − ∆Π)2/8¯ θ − (c − ∆Π)+2 ΠL,
to be compared with the total welfare in the case of a inbred line nondurable good monopoly,
namely 2ΠL − (ΠL − τ)2/2¯ θ. The former is higher than the latter as long as
3(c − ∆Π)2 − 8¯ θ(c − ∆Π)+4 ( ΠL − τ)2 > 0,
which is equivalent to 3X2 − 8¯ θX +4 ( ΠL − τ)2 > 0 with X = c − ∆Π. The solution to this





3. Introduction of a license fee in a diﬀerentiated duopoly
The introduction of a license fee has no impact on seed prices and market structure. Indeed,





0 f(θ)dθ + p∗
2L
R ¯ θ
h θ(τ) f(θ)dθ (7)
with e θ(τ) ≡ min{p1H − (p1L + τ)+c − 2∆Π,¯ θ}.I n t h i s d i ﬀerentiated market, farmers buy
more expensive inbred line seed because they expect to self-produce seed. So the total price
they pay is p1L + τ ≡ pτwhich goes entirely to the producer. It also determines who buys
inbred line seed and self-produces, and who buys seed in both periods. The inbred line producer
adapts her pricing strategy accordingly: she reduces p1L when τ increases so as to let p1L + τ
be unchanged. Formally, replacing p1L + τ with pτ in the objective function in (7) yields the
maximization program (4). Then the inbred line seed producer’s best response and equilibrium
price can be computed the same way. Hence, the license fee does not increase the eﬃciency or
the inbred line producer’s proﬁt in a duopoly competition.
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29Figure 1: Second period surplus sharing with inbred line monopoly, no commitment, and
tax (if τ ≤ ΠL − ¯ θ)
Self-producing farmer surplus
Monopoly proﬁt from the tax
Monopoly proﬁt from the sell of inbred line
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ΠL =1 , ¯ θ =0 .4,τ =0 .7
31Figure 2: Eﬀect of tax on the monopoly proﬁt and surplus with no commitment
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32Figure 3: Choice of the type of seed by a mono-seed monopoly with tax (with non commit-
ment when selling inbred only)
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33Figure 4: Two periods surplus sharing when the monopoly sells both inbred and hybrid at
the period 1 (multiseed monopoly)
Self-producing farmer surplus
Monopoly proﬁt from selling inbred at period 1
Monopoly proﬁt from selling hybrid at period 1
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34Figure 5: Monopoly proﬁt and surplus with multi-seed monopoly, tax (and no commitment
when selling inbred line only)
τ








ΠL =1 , ¯ θ =0 .4,ΔΠ = 0.2,c=0 .6
The dotted curve reminds the curves BL and WL given in ﬁgure 2.
35Figure 6: Choice of the type of seed by a multiseed monopoly with tax (with non commit-
ment when selling inbred only)
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